The Evolution of the Normative Context The Breakdown of North Only Participation on the Road to Montreal

The normative context that the United States acted within was relatively stable in 1986-87, though the seeds for the major transition to universal participation were sown. The negotiations that would yield the Montreal Protocol in 1987 transpired with a clear, intersubjective understanding that ozone depletion was a problem that required Northern participation in negotiations and solutions. Southern nations made up less than one-third of the participants at all three of the pre-Montreal meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group that constructed the Montreal Protocol. The United States, EU, and the rest of the Northern states were mainly concerned about negotiating and reaching a bargain among themselves. Through the summer of 1987, both the North and the South considered the manner of negotiation to be appropriate. Consequently, the actions of both Southern and Northern states in 1986-87 served to reify and reinforce the normative context, rather than change it.

However, the North-only context was not destined to endure. Tolba's suggestions began to take hold in the South. In the summer and fall of 1987, a critical mass of participating Southern states began to emerge. A significant number of Southern states begin participating at Montreal and for the first time, Southern states made up a majority of the participants at an ozone depletion negotiation session. In fact Southern states made up 65 percent of the participants (37/57).109 The significant participation of Southern states at Montreal signaled the beginning of a change in the intersubjective understanding of ozone depletion. Southern participation began to erode the normative context that supported the negotiation of the protocol even as the Montreal negotiations themselves got underway, and this erosion accelerated immediately upon the achievement of the MP.

As Southern states began to take an interest, it became patently obvious that Southern concerns had been neglected in the largely North-only protocol negotiations, despite the efforts of Tolba. The North-only rule that they had followed until 1987 was negatively evaluated. Southern states (especially crucial states such as India, China, and Brazil) were thus dissatisfied with the MP and refused to accede to its provisions. A protocol negotiated with a North-only understanding of ozone depletion was not acceptable to Southern states that now believed that universal participation was the appropriate way to approach the problem.

The NLC/CAS framework, as well as the Pick a Number Model, explains this transition in a very straightforward manner. The norm entrepreneur makes a suggestion. Agents accept it and add it to their rule models. The agents begin to exhibit new behavior (assuming that their current rule has recently performed poorly). If enough agents change their behavior a new norm emerges, altering the normative context. In the actual ozone depletion negotiations, the identity of the norm entrepreneur (Tolba/UNEP) and the suggestion (universal participation) are both clear. However, moving from the suggestion to acceptance to new behavior is less straightforward in the empirical case.110

In essence, the participation of the global South at Montreal increased the social complexity of the ozone depletion issue, significantly eroding the appropriateness of the North-only norm. Tolba, driven by his belief in universal participation, convinced the Southern states to participate in the ozone depletion negotiations. Crucially, this did not necessarily mean that Southern states believed in a grand vision of universal participation. Instead, they came to see their own participation as appropriate and necessary. The altered Southern behavior (participation at Montreal), however, caused a nascent universal participation norm to emerge, consequently changing the normative context. Their behavior instantiated a different understanding of an appropriate global response.

For the analysis of the emergence of universal participation, why the Southern states changed their behavior in some ways matters less than the fact of their changed behavior. However, for the NLC and its focus on an entrepreneur, it is crucial to observe how Tolba facilitated and catalyzed the change of behavior. Tolba may not have imbued each Southern state with an appreciation of universal participation, but he (and UNEP) certainly catalyzed the changed behavior that instantiated universal participation.

The empirical record clearly demonstrates that Southern states changed their understanding of the ozone depletion problem. They no longer accepted the intersubjective understanding that ozone depletion was a Northern problem, and they began following a rule that held that they should be participating. How did this happen? While multiple factors played a part in each Southern state's decision to participate in the governance of ozone depletion, we cannot ignore the catalyzing role of Tolba and UNEP.

At first glance, a number of potential, instrumental reasons are evident for the change in Southern states' avowed disinterest. The impending regulation of an important class of chemicals and concerns about continued access to the chemicals was an important motivation.111 Some observers also point to Southern desires to be associated with environmental protection.112 There were real, economic, and environmental rea sons for Southern states to be interested in the ozone depletion negotiations and these should not be downplayed.113 However, these instrumental incentives existed throughout the 1980s, and a solely instrumental perspective that ignores the NLC and the effects of a norm entrepreneur cannot explain why Southern states recognized the instrumental factors when they did.

Entrepreneurial activity provides an explanation. Tolba and UNEP, through structural, rhetorical, informational, and financial means, convinced Southern states that they should participate and facilitated this participation. First, and potentially most importantly, UNEP provided a forum friendly to universal participation. UNEP was, by design, a universal forum. Most analyses of the Montreal, and post-Montreal negotiations take Southern participation as unproblematic. They display an implicit understanding that the transition from North-only to universal participation went smoothly. In fact, it was a smooth transition, but the very lack of friction deserves treatment. The understanding of ozone deletion as a problem requiring broad participation embedded in UNEP and advocated by Tolba, enabled the frictionless entrance of Southern states into the ozone negotiations. The UNEP forum made the transition smooth, precisely because UNEP had been advocating inclusive negotiations from the very beginning and Southern states had the right to participate from the very beginning. It is not obvious that the transition would have occurred or that it would have gone as effortlessly if the negotiations were taking place in another forum, less amenable to universal participation (the OECD for instance). Southern states were able to participate because the negotiations were taking place in a forum where universal participation was the accepted norm.

Second, and more actively, Tolba and UNEP argued for defining ozone depletion as a problem that requires universal participation. As noted above, Tolba understood from the very beginning that ozone depletion required universal participation and he worked to promote this understanding. In addition, Tolba represented the interests of the South in the negotiations and kept their issues on the agenda. UNEP and Tolba worked to incorporate Southern issues and to facilitate/encourage Southern participation. Their success in this endeavor was at least partly attributable to personal and institutional characteristics—the legitimacy of the entrepreneur and his organizational platform. Peter Morrisette et al. argue that UNEP's "appeal to developing countries rests on the location of its base of operations in a developing country and its Egyptian director, Mostafa Tolba. Its credibility was instrumental in establishing the legitimacy of stratospheric ozone among developing countries."114

Third, UNEP acted to keep Southern states informed about the science of ozone depletion and they provided an atmosphere of objectivity. Downie claims that "UNEP quickly recognized that broad cooperation was necessary to protect stratospheric ozone, and it charted a gradual education and policy process to build a strong regime."115 Building scientific consensus and publicizing scientific results helped UNEP and Tolba persuade states that ozone depletion was a problem that needed to be dealt with—universally. By keeping Southern states informed, Tolba changed the discourse surrounding ozone depletion. This was an especially important factor in UNEP's efforts to persuade initially disinterested and suspicious Southern states to participate:

Because some developing nations feared they would be unfairly and unnecessarily disadvantaged by the proposed regulations, UNEP's efforts [as an information clearing house] increased the likelihood that suspicious nations would take the problem seriously.116

Finally, UNEP encouraged participation directly by funding Southern delegations to the negotiations. UNEP's informational efforts combined with their financing of delegations "helped ensure broad knowledge of the problem and broad participation in addressing it."117 UNEP funded all ten of the Southern delegations to the Vienna negotiations.118 UNEP also funded 60 percent of the thirty-seven Southern states that attended the Montreal negotiations.119

Through structural and active means, Tolba and UNEP had a significant influence on the inclusion of universal participation into Southern rule models. Further, even the motivations for participating that would normally be considered instrumental—loss of access to CFCs and development concerns—were influenced by Tolba and UNEP. The Southern states came to see an interest (political/economic) in ozone depletion precisely because UNEP kept them informed about the problem and provided a universal forum. Thus, incrementally, Southern states began to participate, altering their internal rule models and following a rule that made it appropriate for all states to participate. Just as the framework predicts and the model demonstrated, the activities of Tolba and UNEP altered the social context by convincing an emerging critical mass of Southern states to alter their behavior.

Tolba and UNEP increased the social complexity associated with ozone depletion—providing an alternative to North-only participation and adding diverse new actors to the governance process. This increased social complexity made the appropriateness of North-only participation less clear. Further, Southern discontent with the governance outcomes weakened the North-only rule in Southern rule models. When Southern states began to accept Tolba's suggestion this further eroded the appeal of the North-only norm and it began to dissolve. The Southern change of behavior was not classically "norm-driven." To be very clear, before 1987

there was no intersubjective understanding surrounding the notion of universal participation, so no universal participation norm yet existed. However, Southern states, catalyzed by the entrepreneurship of UNEP and Tolba, came to see their participation as appropriate and crucial. Tolba had presented a different way to understand the global response to ozone depletion and the Southern actions that followed Tolba's suggestions socially constructed the universal participation norm, altering the normative context at the foundation of the governance of ozone depletion. It was the change in Southern actions that caused the universal participation norm to emerge

The growth of a critical mass and the activities of the norm entrepreneur in the ozone depletion case demonstrate both how empirical analysis differs from the model, and why the modeling exercises were useful. One difference between the model and the empirical case is that in the ozone depletion negotiations, the entrepreneur was not a one-shot suggestion maker. UNEP and Tolba made multiple suggestions advocating universal participation. However, as predicted by the model, the suggestions served to knock the social context out of its stability around North-only participation and catalyze a new stable period around universal participation. Tolba's continual suggestions served to lower social complexity for the ozone depletion issue once the North-only norm slipped into instability. Tolba presented a clear idea of what the appropriate participation level should be—universal.

UNEP and Tolba believed that universal participation was the most appropriate way to approach ozone depletion. It was a relatively drawn-out period getting to acceptance of the new idea by a critical mass of states and they worked to persuade states with a variety of means. Some of their actions were structural (i.e., it did not take much active entrepreneur-ship)—UNEP was a universal forum, open to all. Some of their actions were direct—funding Southern participation, providing information, representing Southern interests at the meetings, and calling for further Southern participation.

For the normative context, the bottom line was a growth in Southern participation leading up to the Montreal negotiations—Southern states started to actively participate in the governance of ozone depletion. UNEP and Tolba, overtime, were able to convince a critical mass (and in this case the critical mass was Southern states) that they should be participating. This course of events matches what the framework predicts and the model demonstrated. An entrepreneur, with limited reach, is able to catalyze change in the social context by convincing agents to change their behavior—follow different rules.

Thus, in the summer of 1987, the stable normative context supporting the North-only negotiations began to erode—unbeknownst to or unrecognized by the Northern states who, if they accepted the universal participation rule into their rule models at all, only had universal participation as a potential rule. The political context—the nature of a global response—was changing around them as the South began participating.

Southern participation challenged the intersubjective understanding that ozone depletion required only Northern participation. The Northern states went into the Montreal negotiations still focused on bargaining over emission reductions, less concerned with the interests and desires of the Southern states. The MP negotiations were thus dominated by the United States and EU. Southern concerns began to be voiced, and though the South had yet to seriously push for a set of concessions, their practices changed. The South came to the negotiating table at Montreal for the first time in significant numbers. Previously, the South was just not a part of U.S. strategizing as the North-only norm structured what the United States and other states saw as possible for the governance of ozone depletion. Southern states were an afterthought until Montreal.

Because Tolba kept development issues on the agenda, the negotiators (again mostly from the North) had grappled with ways to diminish the incentives for Southern nations to become CFC producers in addition to allowing the Southern states to meet their legitimate, domestic needs while the major producers switched to substitutes—as secondary concerns. However, as Benedick recalled it was at Montreal, "when considerably more developing countries were in attendance, that specific details were considered."120

The solution, devised in previous negotiations, was a combination of trade restrictions and time lags, along with vague promises of technology transfer. The MP enshrined the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" that would come to define universal participation in the subsequent decades.121 Universal participation would come to mean that all states should participate in governance processes, that the North should take the first concrete actions, and that the North should provide support for Southern states to meet their responsibilities.

The South started "playing" too late to be a major factor at Montreal, as most of the provisions of the MP had already been worked out, 122 and they quickly signaled dissatisfaction with this state of affairs by not signing the MP. Thus, the normative context immediately following Montreal had begun to shift—the appropriateness of North-only negotiations was being challenged and Southern participation, fostered by UNEP and Tolba, was strengthening a new participation requirement for global environmental problems—universal participation. As Paul Horwitz claimed, after the MP negotiations, "You could not now have an environmental negotiation on any issue and only have 25-30 countries around the table."123

The first mention of the South in the MP process in popular media, government reports, and academic analyses usually concerns the concessions in the MP. Analysts most often treat these concessions as the initial conditions for the South-North phase of the negotiating process. This is not inaccurate. The United States, in particular, either took Southern acceptance of the MP for granted in the early negotiations, or was not concerned with Southern states. This situation would soon change, however, as Southern practices began to alter the normative context, causing it to diverge from U.S. internal rule models by October 1987. The United States neglected Southern concerns, confident that the North had a hold on the problem, that the actions the North took would solve the problem, and that the South would go along. Increased Southern participation, however, had begun to alter the normative context that might have led such a prediction to be accurate. Southern states attended the Montreal negotiations and began to show a serious interest. In addition, the major actors in the South (Brazil, China, and India) refused to sign the MP. The South-North phase of the negotiations was about to begin in earnest within an entirely different normative environment—one where universal participation was the prominent rule.

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