Implications

Ihe Governance of Ozone Depletion and Climate Change

The most important empirical implication of this study is an enhanced understanding of the politics of ozone depletion and climate change. The framework developed in this book was able to explain the puzzle of universal participation and answer the questions posed in chapter 1:

• How can we account for changing U.S. positions on participation in the ozone depletion and climate change negotiations from 1985 to the present? Why did the United States come to accept/advocate for universal participation in the late 1980s and then (apparently) reject universal participation by withdrawing from the Kyoto process in 2001?

• Why do we see variations in participation requirements in the international community from 1985 to the present?

• Why did ozone depletion start out as a North-only problem and come to require universal participation? Why did climate change require universal participation from the very beginning? Why have variants arisen in the understanding of universal participation? How does participation matter?

The norm life cycle/CAS framework provides answers for these questions. The transition evident through the ozone depletion negotiations occurred via a process of norm change described by the norm life cycle—a norm entrepreneur (UNEP and Tolba) convinced Southern states to alter their behavior; this altered the social context for other states, driving change throughout the international community. The international community understood that climate change required universal participation from the very beginning, because a norm developed in the ozone depletion negotiations informed states' rule models and structured their understandings of this problem. The United States supported universal participation because it internalized a universal participation norm into its rule models after the ozone depletion experience. The norm life cycle continued to operate, and two variants of universal participation emerged in the 1990s, leading to contestation not over who participates, but how states should participate. The contestation over participation, in part, drove the U.S. withdrawal from the process and has left the governance of climate change at a crossroads. The norm life cycle/CAS framework provides an explanation of crucial aspects of the ozone depletion and climate change regimes.

Parts of the framework at the foundation of this explanation for the transitions in participation were formally assessed, and the entire explanation was tested through qualitative case study analysis. The empirical study demonstrated that the expectations derived in chapters 3 and 4 were indeed observed in the empirical record:

• A norm entrepreneur pushing universal participation did emerge in the ozone depletion negotiations—Mostafa Tolba and UNEP.

• The United States incorporated the new rule (norm) only when old rules were weakened by negative evaluation.

• The positively evaluated rule for universal participation that emerged in the ozone depletion negotiations became taken for granted over time and was reused in a similar situation— climate change.

• The continual interpretation and evaluation of the universal participation norm led to norm-slippage (divergent understandings of universal participation in the United States relative to the rest of the world).

• The norm entrepreneur increased the social complexity evident in the ozone depletion by making suggestions of universal participation, knocking the international community out of a stable North-only norm. Similarly, U.S. suggestions of universal commitments increased the social complexity surrounding climate change, but as yet have been unable to erode the stability of North-first ideas of a global response.

• The norm entrepreneur suggestions in turn decreased the social complexity, catalyzing intersubjective agreement around universal participation.

• The norm entrepreneur only had to convince Southern states to catalyze norm emergence.

The explanation of the social norms at the foundation of the global governance of ozone depletion and climate change developed through the course of this book is crucial because it also provides significant insights into the process and outcomes of governance activities. It is impossible to fully understand the politics of ozone depletion and climate change without understanding the influence of universal participation. Participation requirements defined these issues, determining the structure, substance, and participant strategies in the last two decades.

Participation norms played a crucial role in structuring what was taken for granted and what was debated in the governance of ozone depletion and climate change. While the North-only participation norm was in force, development was not a crucial topic of debate, and all states took for granted that Northern states should devise solutions to the problem. After Tolba catalyzed instability in the North-only norm and the emergence of universal participation, ozone depletion came to have significant North-South dimensions. Similarly, in climate change it was taken for granted that all states should be at the negotiating table and that North-South issues would be prominent. Some of the most contentious debates were over development issues important to the South. In the post-FCCC negotiations, universal participation still influenced the debates by making it obvious that Southern states and their issues would be prominent, and the debate shifted to how states should participate. Participation norms had a similar influence on U.S. strategy and behavior. At each stage in the governance of ozone depletion and climate change, the notion of an appropriate global response shaped U.S. strategy—both when the United States desired to be proactive on an issue and when it proved recalcitrant.

Because the transitions felt "natural" and universal participation appears to be obvious for these problems, norms-based arguments like the one developed in this volume are too often dismissed as unnecessary. However, beyond the evidence compiled to this point it is useful to ponder two additional concerns.

First, consider, for a moment, the obvious counterfactual for the ozone depletion and climate change cases. What would have happened if climate change had come first? Would the global governance of these issues have proceeded differently? If climate change arose to prominence in the mid-1970s it is doubtful that more than one hundred nations would have attended the first negotiating session. In the 1970s and early 1980s there was no context for thinking universally. The characteristics of the problem would have been viewed through lenses that constrained perceptions to national or regional levels of participation—just as happened with ozone depletion. It is the lenses through which problems are viewed that are the key determinant in how a problem is defined and addressed. Climate change was defined as a universal problem precisely because the lenses developed in ozone depletion only allowed actors to see climate change as universal.

If the climate change problem came first, would the lenses developed have been different? It is hard to say. Climate change might have proceeded as ozone depletion did, North-only first, and then a transition to universal. However, given the U.S. reluctance to address climate change, things might have turned out very differently, and I doubt that development assistance principles would have been so prominent had the world confronted climate change before tackling ozone depletion. The point is that so much of what we know about how the governance of climate change proceeded is dependent upon the social norms of participation at the foundation of these activities—they fundamentally constrain and enable the governance of environmental problems.

Second, consider that what everyone knows about climate change— the universality of the problem and the need for a universal global response—may be in the process of changing significantly. To this point, universal participation and contestation over it has defined the governance of climate change, but the robustness and stability of this norm has been called into significant question since 2001. Is universal participation truly locked in or is it eroding?

Most states came out of the ozone depletion negotiations not only understanding the need for universal participation, but also accepting a system of two-track responsibilities—the North would go first and the South would follow. In the FCCC negotiations, we saw the United States attack the two-track understanding and push for common but differentiated responsibility with binding measures for both Northern and Southern states. Because there were few serious binding commitments in the FCCC, this issue was not yet all that contentious. In the post-FCCC negotiations that led to the Kyoto Protocol and more stridently since the inauguration of the second Bush administration, however, the commitments of the South became a larger issue. The United States began to advocate for a different interpretation of universal participation through both rhetorical and material means, eventually exiting from the Kyoto process altogether.

Will the North-first variant of universal participation norm erode through U.S. actions? Will universal participation itself dissolve? The North-first notion of a global response has shown an amazing resilience to the hegemonic challenge—most other states still resist the U.S. suggestion. However, the shift in U.S. climate change positions in 2001-2002 does signal that participation requirements may not remain locked in to the North-first version of universal participation and perhaps universal participation itself is in danger of dissolution. Is the United States a critical mass by itself, able to alter the social context to such a degree that the universal participation norm erodes? That is difficult to say at this time. What is clear, though, is that the norm life cycle/CAS framework and the Pick a Number model demonstrated how the world moved from a North-only rule to a universal participation rule, as well as how universal participation has evolved and may eventually erode. By explaining how the United

States and the international community arrived at the "obvious" definition of climate change as a problem requiring universal participation and how this definition continues to evolve, the norm life cycle/CAS framework provides the necessary tools for understanding how an obvious understanding may change.

Approaching Global Governance

This study demonstrated the efficacy of approaching global governance through a combination of constructivism and complexity theory. The global governance of environmental issues has received significant scrutiny from multiple perspectives.6 Peter Haas argues that in environmental issues "the evolution of global governance has been driven by combinations of scientific understanding, international institutional guidance, market forces, national leadership, and mass concern."7 He and others have identified numerous factors that are important in the rule construction process. This project focused on theorizing the processes of global governance that bring such factors together.8

I began with a notion of global governance similar to Rosenau's notion of governance as the steering mechanism of the international system:

The evolution of intersubjective consensus based on shared fates and common histories, the possession of information and knowledge, the pressure of active or mobilizable publics and/or the use of careful planning, good timing, clever manipulation, and hard bargaining—either separately or in combination—foster control mechanisms that sustain governance without government.9

The ozone depletion and climate change cases point to the importance of the construction of a context of shared understandings in shaping the way that control mechanisms are created—the way that intersubjective understandings give meaning to and constrain information, knowledge, pressure, planning, timing, manipulation, and bargaining. The cases established that the dynamic process of the NLC/CAS produced intersubjective consensus and fostered its evolution, shaped the meaning of scientific knowledge, and influenced the bargaining that promotes governance without government. Specifically, this project demonstrated the importance and utility of unpacking the meaning of a global response. The manner in which the governance of global issues proceeds is heavily influenced by what understanding the actors have of global.

Further, a common understanding of what the global response entails may be a prerequisite for successful governance outcomes. Consider the key governance outcomes in the ozone depletion and climate change:

• The Montreal Protocol

• The London Amendments

• The Framework Convention on Climate Change

• The Kyoto Protocol

In each case, these outcomes were forged upon a foundation of intersubjective agreement—states knew what a global response entailed. For most of the Montreal Protocol process, all states knew that North-only participation was appropriate. For the London Amendments and the FCCC, states knew that universal participation was appropriate. For the Kyoto Protocol, the North-first variant of universal participation structured the governance process. However, consider also that the times of greatest debate—the period between Montreal and London and the post-Kyoto period—also correspond with the transitions in intersubjective understandings. They represent the time when a stable norm governing the global response was not in force. In 1988-1990, universal participation was in the process of becoming the dominant notion of an appropriate global response. Post-1997, norm contestation between universal commitment and North-first shook the stability of universal participation in fundamental ways. The implication is that global governance may require intersubjective understanding of how to respond to a problem.

Constructivist/complex adaptive analysis of the evolution of these foundational norms (in both stable and unstable periods) thus provides significant insight into what was taken for granted and what was debated during the governance of ozone depletion and climate change. Approaching global governance with a macro process of norm emergence (the NLC) and a micro process of actor adaptation (CAS) provides insights into the foundations of governance as well as the process and outcomes of governance. To go farther, the process and outcomes of governance cannot be fully understood unless one grasps the underlying social norm dynamics that constrain and give meaning to the process of global governance.

In addition to a new theoretical approach to global governance, this study provided a glimpse at a potentially useful methodological approach to global governance—one that combines analytical, formal, and (qualitative in this case) empirical analysis.

The analysis of the foundations of global governance of ozone depletion and climate change began with a verbal model of norm dynamics. This explicit verbal model provided a candidate explanation for the observed transitions in participation requirements hypothesized to exert significant influence over the governance of ozone depletion and climate change. By combining the NLC with the insights of complexity theory, I was able to forge a potential explanation and derive empirical expectations and hypotheses. Before going to the empirical record, however, the second stage of analysis called for a formal assessment of the verbal model and candidate explanation.

The Pick a Number model was explicitly designed to represent the NLC, and the simulation exercises fulfilled two goals. The first was to assess the plausibility of the norm life cycle. The constructivist argument relied on the norm life cycle to explain the emergence and evolution of universal participation. The modeling exercises established that the dynamics and processes inherent in the norm life cycle, as configured, could in principle produce phenomena recognizable as norm emergence and evolution. The modeling results confirmed that the norm life cycle/CAS framework does provide a plausible candidate explanation for the observed norm dynamics. Beyond establishing the plausibility of the norm life cycle's explanation for norm emergence, the second goal of the modeling exercises was to begin sketching the boundary conditions for the norm life cycle/CAS framework in preparation for empirical analysis. I wanted to know not just if the norm life cycle dynamics produce norm emergence and change, but under what conditions norm entrepreneurs are able to catalyze these phenomena. The results pointed to important factors to consider empirically—the reach of the norm entrepreneur, and the social complexity of the context facing the agents. Thus, the model provided additional empirical expectations and hypotheses to be tested in the case study analysis.

The direct test of the verbal model was the case studies presented in chapters 5-7. The norm life cycle/CAS framework, enhanced by the modeling exercises, structured the case study analysis. The framework provided empirical expectations and a process to trace empirically. The evidence available in the empirical record demonstrated the appropriateness of this framework for explaining the rise and influence of universal participation.

Given the results of this study, let me plead for methodological eclecticism. We should not be thinking either formal analysis or case studies. Instead, the formal analysis enhances the empirical analysis, and in turn the empirical analysis should inform further modeling efforts. Combining the insights garnered with both methods provides the best analysis. Solid analysis of global governance entails a recursive process of theorizing, modeling, and empirical investigation. This book reports my efforts at moving from theory (NLC/CAS framework) to a simple model (Pick a Number) to an empirical analysis of the ozone depletion and climate change negotiations. Each stage in the analysis produced insights into the global governance of ozone depletion and climate change, but the integration of multiple methods provided a much fuller picture than any of the stages could have independently.

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