New Global Response

1. Pomerance testimony, U.S. House of Representatives 1995.

2. This bracketing is also necessary for brevity. The post-FCCC negotiations have been among the most complex environmental negotiations to date and entire volumes have been dedicated to sorting through the various technical aspects of the negotiations. For more on those debates, see Barret 2003; Luter-bacher and Sprinz 2001; Victor 2001; and McKibbin and Wilcoxen 2002.

3. The sustainable development discourse was important as well. See Bernstein 2001.

4. To be very clear, I am labeling the United States as a hegemon because of its overall position in the international system and its prominent place in the climate change issue. This does not mean that the United States can solve the climate change problem by itself or that it can force other states to view climate change the way it does. In fact, one result of this analysis is that hegemonic status does not always lead to successful entrepreneurship in the face of an entrenched norm.

5. Klotz 1995a.

7. Price 1997; Ba and Hoffmann 2003.

8. On types of change see Rosenau 1995; 1997.

9. See Bernstein 2001; 2002; Betsill 2000.

10. Finnemore and Sikkink, 891 (emphasis added).

11. This is not to claim that the United States is somehow "outside" the normative context picking what norms to follow. Instead, the universal participation norm constituted U.S. interests in and strategies for addressing climate change. Because norms are not wholly deterministic, different interests, norms, and ideas combine to shape any actor's interpretation of the norm (as well as their goals and strategies), but no actor can help being constituted by their normative context.

12. Dessler 1989.

13. UNGA 1992b.

14. Of course, enticing Southern commitments was not the only reason for pursuing these mechanisms—the United States has long desired to use market-mechanisms to pursue environmental goals. See Pomerance testimony, U.S. Senate 1994; UN FCCC 1995a, 83.

15. The CDM was a Brazilian proposal supported by the United States. See Yamin 1998.

16. This also signaled a continuing commitment to market mechanisms.

17. See Agrawala and Andresen 2001, 121.

18. Hazel O'Leary testimony, U.S. Senate 1994. See also, Karl Huakser (Deputy Assistant Administrator, EPA) testimony U.S. House of Representatives 1994; 1995; Susan Tierney (Assistant Secretary for Policy, Department of Energy) testimony, U.S. House of Representatives 1995.

19. See U.S. Statement in UNFCCC 1995a, 75-86.

21. O'Leary and Pomerance testimonies, U.S. Senate 1994.

23. Pomerance testimony, U.S. House of Representatives 1994.

24. Pomerance testimony, U.S. House of Representatives 1995.

25. Pomerance testimony, U.S. House of Representatives 1994.

26. Again, the goals of any actor are not determined solely by a single norm. While universal participation shaped how the United States envisioned climate change, multiple ideational influences combined to constitute U.S. goals in the negotiation.

27. Earth Negotiations Bulletin 1995a, 2.

28. Pomerance testimony, U.S. Senate 1994.

30. Pomerance testimony, U.S. Senate 1994.

31. The principle of CBDR was invoked constantly in country statements and the principle of Northern support for Southern action was never questioned— implementing such support was, however, a much more contentious issue.

32. See UN FCCC 1995a; 1995b; 1995c; 1995d.

33. Earth Negotiations Bulletin 1995a; 1995b; 1995c; 1995d.

34. See UN FCCC 1995a, especially statements of Brazil, Denmark, France, Micronesia, and Trinidad and Tobago.

35. Ibid., especially statements by United States, Canada, Australia, Russia, and New Zealand.

36. Ibid., especially statements of United States and Canada.

37. Ibid., especially statements of Denmark and Netherlands.

38. See UN FCCC 1995c; Earth Negotiations Bulletin 1995c. The procedural items concerned location of the Secretariat, voting rules, etc.

39. See Pomerance testimony, U.S. House of Representatives 1994; UN FCCC 1995a.

40. See Pomerance testimony, U.S. House of Representatives 1994; UN FCCC 1995a.

41. See Pomerance testimony, U.S. House of Representatives 1994; Earth Negotiations Bulletin 1995a; 1995b, 1; 1995c; UN FCCC 1995a.

42. Pomerance testimony, U.S. House of Representatives 1994; 1995; Earth Negotiations Bulletin 1995c; UN FCCC 1995c.

43. JI is not only intended for North-South cooperation, but is instead a general mechanism for achieving emission reductions in an efficient manner. See UN FCCC 1995c.

44. Testimony of Timothy Wirth (Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs), U.S. Senate 1996.

46. The United States agreed that lag times may be appropriate as was the case in ozone depletion.

47. Wirth Testimony, U.S. Senate 1996. See also Administration Statement, U.S. House of Representatives 1996b.

48. Chairman Murkowski testimony, U.S. Senate 1996.

49. UN FCCC 1995e.

50. Pomerance testimony, U.S. House of Representatives 1996a.

51. UN FCCC 1995e.

52. Earth Negotiations Bulletin 1996b, 10.

53. UN FCCC 1996b, 30. See also UN FCCC 1995d.

54. This was a constant theme before and at COP 2. See Earth Negotiations Bulletin 1996b, 7.

55. Earth Negotiations Bulletin 1995d, 2.

56. Earth Negotiations Bulletin 1995d, 2; UN FCCC 1996a, especially the EU statement.

57. Earth Negotiations Bulletin 1995d, 3.

58. UN FCCC 1996a.

59. Earth Negotiations Bulletin 1996a, 9.

60. Earth Negotiations Bulletin 1996b, 9, 12; UN FCCC 1996b.

61. Earth Negotiations Bulletin 1996b, 12

62. Andresen and Agrawala 2002, 47.

64. Putnam 1998; Evans et al. 1993. On the issue of congressional thoughts on Southern commitments, see, U.S. House of Representatives 1997a; 1997b; 1997c; 1997d; 1997e; U.S. Senate 1997a; 1997b; 1997d.

65. Testimony of Chairman Gilman, U.S. House of Representatives 1997e.

66. See testimony of Stuart Eizenstat (Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs), U.S. House of Representatives 1998a; See also Agrawala and Andresen 2001.

67. Testimony of Janet Yellen (Chairwoman, Council of Economic Advisors), U.S. Senate 1997b.

69. Testimony of Wirth, U.S. Senate 1997b.

71. Earth Negotiations Bulletin 1997, 2.

72. For analysis of various aspects of the Kyoto meeting and the KP see Barret 2003; Harrison 2000b; Yamin 1998; Simpson 2002; Andresen and Agrawala 2002.

73. See UN FCCC 1997a.

74. Andresen and Agrawala 2002, 48. See also Eizenstat testimony in U.S. Senate 1998.

75. The EU was also hampered at times, by incoherence in its positions due to internal dissension. On this point see Andresen and Agrawala 2002, 47-49; Sbragia and Damro 1999.

76. Agrawala and Andresen 2001, 123. See also UN FCCC 1997b.

77. Earth Negotiations Bulletin 1997m 14.

78. See Victor 2001; McKibbin and Wilcoxen 2002.

79. See especially, U.S. House of Representatives 1998b; U.S. Senate 1998.

80. The Washington Post, 11 December 1997, a37.

81. See U.S. House of Representatives 1998a; U.S. Senate 1998.

82. Statement of Chairman Gilman, U.S. House of Representatives 1998a, 2.

83. The environmental community was less than enthusiastic, for different reasons, characterizing the KP as "a baby step towards a solution" to the climate change problem. The Washington Post, 14 December 1997, a10.

84. Testimony of Melinda Kimble (Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans), U.S. House of Representatives 1998b.

85. Eizenstat testimony U.S. House of Representatives 1998a, 17. See also Eizenstat testimony U.S. Senate 1998.

86. Eizenstat testimony, U.S. House of Representatives 1998a, 19.

88. Earth Negotiations Bulletin 1998, 13.

90. Tangen (1999, 178) posited that a change in the Southern position was possible, but it never materialized.

91. See International Affairs 2001; UN FCCC 1999; 2000.

92. Earth Negotiations Bulletin 1998, 11.

93. Tangen 1999, 176.

94. Vespa 2002, 406.

95. Simpson 2002, 45.

96. Earth Negotiations Bulletin 1999, 15.

97. This information gathered from UN FCCC website. See http:// unfccc.int/resource/kpco2.pdf.

98. See Lisowski 2002, 164. See also White House 2001, 13-14.

99. Simpson (2002, 42) traces this position of the Bush II administration from COP 4-6 during the Clinton administration.

100. The New York Times, 24 July 2001, al; White House 2001, 13.

101. Lisowski 2002, 164; Agrawala and Andresen 2001, 125; White House 2001; 13.

102. Indeed, in subsequent climate negotiations, the international community has spent considerable time trying to convince the United States to re-engage. See The New York Times, 19 December 2004 (www.nytimes.com/2004/12/19/ science/19climate.html).

103. See, UN FCCC 2001a; 2001b; 2002.

104. Lisowski 2002, 163.

105. See UN FCCC website <http://unfccc.int/resource/kpthermo.html>.

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