The Governance Of Climate Change I

2. Everything from breathing to growing rice, to burning coal, wood, and oil produces carbon dioxide or methane—the chief anthropogenic greenhouse gases.

3. Dowdeswell and Kinley 1994, 115.

4. Obviously the sources and impacts of the problem are not distributed equally among nations.

5. Michael Farrell from Oak Ridge National Laboratories, quoted in International Environment Reporter 1988j, 537.

6. Donna Fitzpatrick, Undersecretary, Department of Energy, quoted in: U.S. House of Representatives 1988b, 86 (emphasis added).

7. Richard Morgenstern, Deputy Assistant Administrator U.S. EPA (Office of Policy, Planning, and Evaluation) quoted in: U.S. Senate 1991, 149 (emphasis added).

8. See Haas 1992; Litfin 1994; Bernstein 2001.

9. See Litfin 1994; Demerit 2002.

10. In this chapter and volume I discuss the EU as a single bloc—as they negotiated with a single voice. See Sbragia and Damro 1999 on the development of the EU's environmental voice.

11. International Environment Reporter 1988f, 385.

12. Bernstein 2001. Past 1988, when the normative context had transformed to universal participation, what scientists considered to be necessary changed as well.

14. International Environment Reporter 1986c, 285.

15. Lester Brown of the Worldwatch Institute, quoted in International Environment Reporter 1987c, 120-21. The Mitre Corporation (a U.S. Defense Department think tank) came to this same conclusion. See International Environment Reporter 1987e, 665-66.

16. Author interviews with William Nitze and Daniel Reifsnyder—both reiterated the importance of China and India.

17. Author interview with William Nitze.

18. Barrett 1992, 16.

19. Sandbrook 1991, 415—he is discussing the situation in 1991, and may be recounting historical responsibility for current concentrations in the atmosphere.

20. Sebenius 1991.

21. Author interview with Frederick Bernthal.

22. The United States and the other Northern states, did, however, have to pay for Southern participation in the negotiations themselves; setting up a participation fund to ensure that the South was represented at the negotiations.

23. Dowdeswell and Kinley 1994, 115 (emphasis in original).

24. Part of the U.S. commitment and ease in internalization of the universal participation idea can be attributed to industrial concerns and their commitment to global competitiveness. Industry's understanding of the problem was constrained by the normative context as well.

25. International Environment Reporter 1988a, 105.

26. Global Climate Change Digest 1989c.

27. Jager and Ferguson 1991, 509.

28. Author interviews with Daniel Reifsnyder and Eileen Claussen.

29. Author interview with Daniel Reifsnyder.

30. Author interview with Reifsnyder. See also Tolba 1998; and Rowlands 1995—the MP is most often credited with setting the stage for the structure of the climate change negotiations.

31. U.S. House of Representatives 1988a, 5.

32. The Los Angeles Times, 4 February 1990, 4.

33. U.S. House of Representatives 1989b, 13. This quote also demonstrates that the United States was committed to development assistance before any negotiations took place.

34. Daniel Reifsnyder traces the use of the GEF in climate change as a response to the Multilateral Fund in ozone and the fear in Europe and the United States of the consequences of universal participation. Author interview with Daniel Reifsnyder.

35. Brown 1990.

36. See Sebenius 1991; Soroos 1991; and Nilsson and Pitt 1994.

37. Bodansky 1994, 58.

38. Author interview with Paul Horwitz.

39. Author interview with Paul Horwitz.

40. Author interview with Stephen Andersen.

41. Curiously, states ignored the early North-only definition of the ozone depletion problem, demonstrating how a new norm can shift understandings of what is possible and impossible.

42. International Environment Reporter 1988g, 417.

44. Ibid. At this early stage, this was mostly rhetoric, but it came to have a significant impact as universal participation dominated nations' understanding of climate change.

45. International Environmental Reporter 1988l, 644-45.

46. International Environmental Reporter 1989g, 335-36.

47. Djoghlaf 1994, 100-101.

48. Djoghlaf 1994. Author interview with Reifsnyder reinforced the notion that South's interest in the IPCC process.

49. UNGA 1988.

51. International Environment Reporter 1989i, 527.

52. Text of Noordwijk Declaration, from International Environment Reporter 1989j, 624-27.

54. Jager and Ferguson 1991.

55. Bodansky 1994, 50.

56. Jager and Ferguson 1991, 517.

60. The Washington Post, 30 October 1990, a17.

61. U.S. House of Representatives 1989b, 6.

62. International Environment Reporter 1989b, 109—first quote is direct from Tolba, the second is a paraphrased statement from Tolba in the article text.

63. In an interview, Nitze recalled that the issue wasn't "worth fighting over" for the United States.

64. International Environment Reporter 1991a, 3.

65. Author interview with William Nitze.

66. At this stage the discussion of "North-south issues during 1988 and the beginning of 1989 was long on vague statements of intent, but short on specific proposals." Rowlands 1995, 192.

67. In discussing U.S. positions, and U.S. interactions with Congress, I am using U.S. as shorthand for the administration and executive branch agencies— the entities that articulated the U.S. positions in the negotiations and domestically.

68. The United States had a history of dealing with climate change before 1988-1990. The United States was at the forefront of climate science at the behest of the Carter administration. See Harrison 2000b.

69. All of the officials interviewed who were involved with the climate change issue acknowledged that climate change was defined as a global problem requiring wide participation.

70. Author interviews with Eileen Claussen, Stephen Seidel.

71. Author interview with Eileen Claussen.

72. Testimony of William Nitze in: U.S. Senate 1987, 157.

73. Nitze testimony, U.S. House of Representatives 1989b, 11.

74. International Environment Reporter 1989d, 178. The quote references EPA report: Lashoff and Tirpak 1990.

75. Lashoff and Tirpak 1990—The report does not treat India separately, thus making the "rest of the developing world" category important. A large percentage of this category's importance is likely found in India and Brazil.

76. The EPA was certainly environmentally aggressive (author interview with Richard Morgenstern) though their view did not come through often. The State Department also tended to favor aggressive international action. See The Washington Post, 6 May 1989, a2. Bodansky (1994, 50-51) claims that the aggressive actions of those two agencies in the MP negotiations spurred the Reagan and Bush administrations to keep control of the climate process in the White House.

77. International Environment Reporter 1986b, 241.

78. As early as 1986 President Reagan's science advisor was highlighting the uncertainty of climate science. See International Environment Reporter 1986b, 241.

79. International Environment Reporter 1988i, 476.

80. Global Climate Change Digest 1989a.

81. See for instance: The Boston Globe, 12 February 1990, 33.

82. This is not to say that there was no uncertainty or that the costs of combating climate change were negligible. However, the decision to focus on uncertainty and economics rather than the potential urgency of the problem was the result of domestic political decisions. See Bodansky 1994, 51. In addition major U.S. industries were vehemently opposed to significant climate change actions and they influenced U.S. positions throughout the climate process.

83. See The Washington Post, 26 October 1989, a15; and Bodansky 1994, 54.

84. Rowlands 1995, 134. See also Council of Economic Advisors 1990, ch. 6. There were other cost estimates around, and many were much less dire than this one.

85. The Washington Post, 29 July 1988, a17.

86. Author interview with Frederick Bernthal.

87. For more on the issue of scientific uncertainty, see Betsill 2000.

88. Paterson 1996, 64.

90. This linkage was reinforced by the sustainable development discourse. See Bernstein 2001.

91. Strategic bargaining has been used to explain a number of outcomes in environmental politics (see Porter and Brown 1996; and Grubb et al. 1993), and it has traditionally been viewed as the primary tactic by which the South can force the North to acknowledge the link between environmental protection and development and achieve developmental concessions. See Hurrell 1992; Sell 1996; and Sanderson 1993.

92. Schoppa 1999, 311.

95. Lebow 1996, 56-60. The ozone situation is aptly characterized as a Type I encounter, while climate change is not.

96. For the United States, the costs of solution to the climate change problem are staggering and the benefits diffuse. In addition, the South was not a unified block. Small island nations stood to benefit from a solution to the climate change problem, while oil-producing and coal-using states did not.

97. The large ones are focused on because of their power to undermine agreements. Smaller Southern countries, especially island states, are more likely to be in favor of environmental agreement because of the potential damage of global warming. They therefore lack interest asymmetry, while also having less power to undermine agreements.

100. Ibid.

101. Rowlands 1995, 198-99.

102. Young 1994.

103. The sustainable development discourse gained strength in this same period (Bernstein 2001). However, universal participation was still crucial because Southern participation guaranteed that Southern issues would be on the agenda.

104. International Environment Reporter 1988c.

105. Author interview with Daniel Reifsnyder.

106. Nitze recalls that choosing to head up this working group, rather than the science working group "saved the IPCC process" because it saved the scientific group from being politicized. Author interview with William Nitze.

107. International Environment Reporter 1988e.

108. The Washington Post, 2 February 1989, a34. The no-regrets policy became a standard mantra of the United States. Fredrick Bernthal coined the term. Author interview with Frederick Bernthal.

109. International Environment Reporter 1989f, 279.

110. The San Francisco Chronicle, 8 May 1989, a19.

111. See U.S. Senate 1989a, 143-45. This action did not endear the administration to Congress or the international community, and it has been cited as a possible factor in the change in U.S. position toward accepting negotiations. See Bodansky 1994, 54.

112. The Los Angeles Times, 12 May 1989, 24. It is not entirely clear why the criticism triggered acquiescence at this stage.

113. Global Climate Change Digest 1989b.

114. Though the United States acquiesced in May, Nitze recalls that the final realization that negotiations were going to take place did not happen until the November Noordwijk meeting. Author interview with William Nitze.

115. The Los Angeles Times, 1 November 1989, 8.

116. The Wall Street Journal, 8 November 1989.

117. The Washington Post, 7 November 1989, a1.

119. Ibid., 10. He also objected to the one-shot nature of Noordwijk, outside the UN process.

120. Global Climate Change Digest 1990a.

121. Global Climate Change Digest 1990c.

122. The Washington Post, 19 April 1990, a19.

123. The Los Angeles Times, 11 July 1990, 10.

124. The Boston Globe, 29 June 1990, 3.

128. The Boston Globe, 24 October 1990, 26.

129. Ibid.

130. The Boston Globe, 29 October, 1990, 1.

131. The Washington Post, 8 November 1990, a22.

132. Jager and Ferguson 1991, 537.

133. U.S. House of Representatives 1991, 12.

135. The Washington Post, 10 January 1991, a3; The Washington Post, 9 February 1991, a3.

136. U.S. House of Representatives 1991, 29.

138. Testimony of Representative Kostmayer in: U.S. House of Representatives 1991, 39.

139. This principle allowed the United States to "count" the actions it was already taking to comply with the MP process, because CFCs are important greenhouse gases as well.

140. Testimony of Robert Reinstein in: U.S. House of Representatives 1991, 11-12.

141. UNGA 1991a.

142. The Washington Post, 15 February 1991, a6.

143. See U.S. House of Representatives 1991; U.S. Senate 1991.

144. C. Dasgupta quoted in: International Environment Reporter 1991b, 65.

145. Author interview with Daniel Reifsnyder. However the ultimate U.S. focus came to be economic concerns/competitiveness in the climate change issue.

146. International Environment Reporter 1991c, 97.

147. Author interview with Daniel Reifsnyder.

148. Author interview with Sue Biniaz (Legal Advisor, Oceans, Environment, and Science Bureau, U.S. State Department).

149. Author interview with Sue Biniaz.

150. This quote is a paraphrased version of Ripert's statement in, International Environment Reporter 1991b, 65.

151. The Washington Post, 17 April 1991, b3.

152. UNGA 1991b. This was a series of informal papers provided by delegations.

154. UNGA 1991c.

159. International Environment Reporter 1991e, 415.

160. International Environment Reporter 1991f, 417.

161. International Environment Reporter 1991g, 440-41.

162. International Environment Reporter 1991d, 400.

163. International Environment Reporter 1991h, 502.

164. Ibid.

165. Ibid.

167. International Environment Reporter 1991h, 502, quoting Zammit Cutajar, chief of negotiating committee secretariat.

168. See International Environment Reporter 1991i, 539; International Environment Reporter 1991j, 539-40; and International Environment Reporter 1991k, 673-74.

169. Bodansky 1994, 66; Hampson 1995, 319.

170. UNGA 1992a, 18-130.

172. Ibid.

173. Ibid., 18-130. This was especially true of the commitments section.

174. The Washington Post, 27 February 1992, a8.

175. U.S. House of Representatives 1992, 158.

178. A Commerce Department report detailing the impacts of carbon taxes to control climate change showed the United States being relatively worse off than all other OECD states. Ibid., 101-13.

180. The Washington Post, 28 February 1992, a3.

181. The Washington Post, 12 April 1992, a44.

182. Bodansky 1994, 68-69.

183. The Washington Post, 8 May 1992, a15.

184. Bodansky 1994, 69.

185. First part of the quote is from The Washington Post, 8 May 1992, a15 and the second part is from The Washington Post, 7 June 1992, a28.

186. Young and Reilly 1992, 23.

187. The Washington Post, 1 June 1992, a1.

188. Text of UNFCCC, Article 11 "Financial Mechanism," in Mintzer and Leonard 1994, 353.

189. Text of UNFCCC Article 4, "Commitments," Ibid., 344-45.

190. Text of UNFCCC Article 4, "Commitments," Ibid., 341-47.

191. Text of UNFCCC Article 4, "Commitments," Ibid.

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