Ozone Depletion

1. See Haas 1992; Rowlands 1995; Litfin 1994; Parson 1993; and Hamp-son 1995.

2. James Rosenau coined the categories sovereignty free and sovereignty bound in an attempt to move beyond state-centric thinking. See Rosenau 1990.

3. UNEP 1979a.

4. International Environment Reporter 1986e, 331.

5. Obviously, this is a simplification—the rule model that the United States was using at this time was not somehow natural or static, rather, it is a snapshot of an evolving rule model.

6. Article 8 in Vienna Convention, reprinted in Benedick 1991, 218-29.

7. Figures derived from Benedick 1991, 265-69.

9. The work of the CCOL and the reports from its numerous meetings can be found at http://www.unep.org/ozone.

10. The full name of the ad hoc committee was: The Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts for the Preparation of the Protocol on Chlorofluorocarbons to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer. For reports on these committee meetings, see UNEP 1986e; UNEP 1987a; and UNEP 1987b.

11. The eighth meeting of the CCOL was split into two parts. The first met in February 1986 and had three Southern attendees. The second met in November of 1986 and had no Southern attendees. See UNEP 1986a; 1986c. In two CCOL-sponsored workshops Southern states accounted for seven out of twenty-three and eight out of twenty-six attendees. See UNEP 1986b; UNEP 1986d.

13. Author interview with Stephen Seidel. The Toronto Group consisted of the United States, Canada, and the Scandinavian countries.

14. Author interview with Paul Horwitz

16. Tolba 1998, 63-64; Rowlands 1995, 165.

17. Rowlands 1995, 165.

18. Benedick 1991 highlights the potential of the South, but curiously, he only notes it as an issue after the Montreal negotiations.

19. Rowlands 1995, 165.

20. Author interview with Allan Miller (National Resource Defense Council, Global Environment Fund).

21. Text of Vienna Convention, Preamble and Article 4—reprinted in Benedick 1991, 218-29.

22. Parson 1993.

23. Hampson 1995.

24. Miller 1995, 73.

25. See Downie 1995a; and UNEP 1979b for a history of UNEP. See also, Bernstein 2001, 56-57.

29. Miller 1995, 73.

30. Author interview with Paul Horwitz.

31. Downie 1995a, 173-74.

33. Sims highlights the misgivings the South had about the possibility that the ozone problem would be globalized by the North and would adversely affect the South. See Sims 1996, 201-14.

34. See Harrison 2000b, for more on the development of U.S. foreign policy toward ozone depletion and climate change in the 1970s.

35. Benedick 1991, 42-43.

36. In this case, universal participation fit with the U.S. government's goal of competitiveness and U.S. corporations' goal of a level regulatory playing field.

37. The San Francisco Chronicle, 2 July 1986, g4.

38. Environment Reporter 1986, 2134; International Environment Reporter 1986a; International Environment Reporter 1986d, 286.

39. See Parson 1993, 41; International Environment Reporter 1986f, 346-48.

40. International Environment Reporter 1986f, 346.

41. The ozone hole crisis lowered the social complexity surrounding the decision to address ozone depletion—the possible actions narrowed down to one—significant action was seen as the only appropriate response. However, the crisis did not alter the U.S. notions of participation.

42. See U.S. House of Representatives 1987, 119-30 for the Circular 175 document authorizing the United States to negotiate an ozone protocol. See also The Wall Street Journal, 6 November 1986.

43. As quoted in The Washington Post, 30 November 1986, a4.

45. International Environment Reporter 1986f, 348.

46. Early EU positions are evident in a draft protocol it submitted to UNEP for the December 1986 Geneva negotiating session. See UNEP 1986f.

47. It should be noted, however, that throughout the negotiations both antagonists were proposing actions that they had already taken. See Litfin 1994; Parson 1993.

49. See Litfin 1994, 107.

50. Litfin 1994, 107; and Parson 1993.

51. The EU was especially concerned about competitiveness and perceived the United States to be ahead in the development of substitutes—See Tolba 1998, 62.

52. Author interview with David Doniger (Natural Resources Defense Council).

53. Author interview with Stephen Andersen (EPA Global Change division).

54. Testimony of Negroponte (Assistant Secretary of State, OES), U.S. Senate 1987, 45.

57. In an interview with Paul Horwitz, when I asked about Tolba and UNEP I was stopped and told that in the ozone issue UNEP = Tolba.

58. Rowlands 1995, 224.

59. Author interview with Paul Horwitz.

60. See Parson 1993, 59; and for quote Ling 1992.

61. See Benedick 1991; Tolba 1998.

62. Author interview with Paul Horwitz.

63. Miller 1995, 74.

64. Benedick 1991, 72. Author interviews with Stephen Seidel confirmed this assertion

65. Author interview with Paul Horwitz.

66. Hampson 1995, 263-66.

67. Early USSR positions proposed a set of CFC control measures. See UNEP 1986h.

68. UNEP 1986e.

69. UNEP 1986g; and UNEP1986e, 4.

70. See UNEP 1986e, 15; and Benedick 1991, 70. While the EU was attempting to slow the negotiations, it is also clear that some of their "maneuver-ings" were actually the result of difficulties negotiating as both a single body—the EU commission—and several states.

71. International Environment Reporter 1986g, 442; International Environment Reporter 1987a.

72. U.S. Senate 1987. Negroponte remarked that Argentina, Brazil, and Egypt were active.

74. UNEP 1986e, 5-6. The quote is from Argentina's representative.

76. Eileen Claussen noted that in early 1987, it was clear that Southern countries were going to be players sometime in the future. Author interview with Claussen (former director EPA Atmospheric and Indoor Air Programs and former Assistant Secretary of State, OES). U.S. actions, however, make it clear that the United States did not consider them to be much of a factor in 1987.

77. Quoted in International Environment Reporter 1986g, 442.

78. International Environment Reporter 1987a.

79. The San Francisco Chronicle, 19 February 1987, 16; Environment Reporter 1987a, 1796.

81. Benedick 1991, 70-71.

83. Parson 1993, 42.

85. Environment Reporter 1987b, 1828.

86. Benedick 1991, 55-58.

87. Environment Reporter 1987c, 2008. This would seem to signal the lack of interest of Southern states that would not support aggressive action (China and India) as well as a lack of concern with those states' absence.

88. Environment Reporter 1987c, 2007. See also, Environment Reporter 1987d; International Environment Reporter 1987b, 100-101—in this latter article there is no mention of the South.

89. Benedick 1991, 72; Tolba 1998, 71.

91. See Benedick 1991, 72; and Tolba 1998, 71. It is interesting, given Tolba's views on the need for participation, that the South was not included. Tolba kept development issues on the agenda, but the main obstacles to agreement were disputes between the EU and the United States.

92. Benedick 1991, 72.

93. Tolba 1998, 71

94. The San Francisco Chronicle, 13 May 1987, a1.

95. International Environment Reporter 1987d, 195-96.

97. The Washington Post, 29 May 1987, a1; and Benedick 1991, 58-62.

98. Benedick 1991, 58-62.

99. See The San Francisco Chronicle, 6 June 1987, 9; and The Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, July 1987, 1477.

100. The South or Southern concerns (regarding ozone depletion) were not mentioned in any article in the summer of 1987 in either the top fifty U.S newspapers or the summer issues of the International Environment Reporter.

101. UNEP 1987c.

102. The Boston Globe, 8 September 1987, 1.

103. The San Diego Union-Tribune, 10 September 1987, a17.

104. The Boston Globe, 12 September 1987, 16.

105. Environment Reporter 1987e, 1347.

106. Benedick 1991, 74.

108. Parsons 1993, 60.

109. UNEP 1987c.

110. This does not invalidate the framework or model work, rather, this is why both modeling and case studies are valuable.

112. Author interview with Alan Miller.

113. Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999 discuss the crucial importance of instrumental behavioral change in the socialization process.

114. Morrisette, Pantinga, and Toman 1991, 213.

115. Downie 1995a, 180.

117. Ibid.

118. Miller 1995, 74.

119. UNEP 1987c.

120. Benedick 1991, 93.

121. Tolba 1998, 73.

122. Miller 1995, 78-79.

123. Author interview with Paul Horwitz.

124. Author interview with Stephen Seidel.

125. The Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 19 September 1987,

2283.

126. The Boston Globe, 20 September 1987, a25. In addition, the MP succeeded in generating a substitute "race."

127. The San Francisco Chronicle, 28 October 1987, a24.

128. Benedick 1991, 216.

129. The Washington Post, 27 September 1988, a3; The Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 19 March 1988, 706.

130. The Washington Post, 27 September 1988, a3.

131. The Boston Globe, 17 September 1987, 12; and Menyasz 1987, 534.

132. U.S. House of Representatives 1990b, 48.

133. The Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 20 February 1988, 370; International Environment Reporter 1988d, 210-11; and International Environment Reporter 1988h, 465.

134. International Environment Reporter 1988b, 111.

135. Global Climate Change Digest 1988.

136. The Wall Street Journal, 25 March 1988. Indeed, it is hard to overestimate the importance of industry's role in pushing universal participation in ozone depletion. Though industry did not create this vision of a global response, once it was in place, industry played a crucial role in fostering the evolution of U.S. rule models toward universal participation.

137. India did not even attend the MP negotiations.

138. Rowlands 1995, 169-70.

139. International Environment Reporter 1988d, 226.

140. Author interview with Alan Miller.

141. The Washington Post, 27 September 1988, a3.

142. Author interview with Paul Horwitz.

143. Stafford 1988, 67-70.

144. U.S. House of Representatives 1989a, 1.

146. Both Stephen Seidel and Paul Horwitz pointed out the desire for new markets as possible industry motivation.

147. The Los Angeles Times, 30 September 1988, 3.

148. U.S. House of Representatives 1989a, 264.

149. The Wall Street Journal, 25 March 1988.

150. Quoted in The Los Angeles Times, 21 March 1988, 1.

151. Quoted in The San Francisco Chronicle, 17 December 1988, a13.

152. U.S. House of Representatives 1990a, 58.

153. U.S. House of Representatives 1989a, 77-78, 1002.

155. Again, I am bracketing larger constitutive effects that a universal participation norm may have had on U.S. goals themselves. The U.S. desire to solve the ozone depletion problem did not solely stem from environmental concern— the convergence of the interests of environmental NGOs and the chemical industry drove U.S. interests at this point.

156. Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999.

157. Bernstein 2001; 2002.

158. Haas 1991, 224.

159. Stephen Seidel recalled that both India and China were concerned with the potential for being left behind technologically. Author interview with Stephen Seidel.

160. Quoted in Menyasz 1987, 534.

161. Quoted in The Los Angeles Times, 6 March, 1.

162. Such an approach may have been appealing to those large Southern states in that they would not have had to share the development assistance funds with other states.

163. The evidence for this statement is more in the lack of statements for a splitting up of the Southern negotiating block, rather than in positive statements of solidarity.

164. UNEP report printed in U.S. House of Representatives 1989a, 1050.

166. Author interviews with Eileen Claussen, Stephen Seidel, and Paul Horwitz.

167. The new understanding was relatively easy to internalize and felt like incremental change because it "fit" with the interests of many of the important players and normative understandings within the United States and because global had defined the rhetoric from the very start. Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 908-909 and Bernstein 2001 note the importance of fit.

168. Normative "choice" may seem an inappropriate term, given my assertion that no options other than universal participation were available. However, it was a choice in the same sense that rational choices are indeed "choices." In rational choice, there really are no options as it is possible to calculate the optimal course of action.

169. UNEP 1989.

170. UNEP 1989, paragraph 11.

171. The Washington Post, 3 March 1988, a1.

172. Dickson and Marshall 1989, 1279.

173. International Environment Reporter 1988k, 643.

174. Quoted in The Los Angeles Times, 6 March 1989, 1.

175. Litfin 1994, 129.

176. International Environment Reporter 1989a, 106.

177. Ironically, Bernstein traces the original use of the polluter pays principle internationally to the OECD. See Bernstein 2001.

178. International Environment Reporter 1989c, 169; and International Environmental Reporter 1989a, 106.

179. International Environment Reporter 1989c, 169; The Washington Post 7 March 1989, a16.

180. The Boston Globe, 8 March 1989, 3.

181. Ibid.

182. International Environment Reporter 1989a, 106; and International Environment Reporter 1989c, 169.

183. UNEP 1989, paragraph 11.

184. Benedick 1991, 125.

185. UNEP 1989, paragraphs 23-25.

186. Frederick Bernthal, quoted in International Environment Reporter 1989e, 226.

187. International Environment Reporter 1989e, 225.

188. U.S. House of Representatives 1989a, 77.

189. Baker 1990, 19.

190. See International Environment Reporter 1989h, 336.

191. The San Diego Union-Tribune, 25 January 1990, a7.

192. U.S. House of Representatives 1990a, 61.

193. Global Climate Change Digest 1990b.

194. The Washington Post, 9 May 1990, a1.

195. Ibid.

196. The Washington Post, 10 May 1990, a21.

197. The Washington Post, 16 June 1990, a1.

198. The Los Angeles Times, 21 June 1990, 7.

199. UNEP 1990.

200. The Los Angeles Times, 23 June 1990, 3.

201. U.S. House of Representatives 1990b, 6.

203. Sell 1996.

204. Dessler 1989.

205. See UNEP 1999, Table 1. Available at: www.unep.org/ozone/ DataReport99.htm. The numbers may be slightly off as some states were not required to report their production levels.

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