Alternative Stories

1. See Young 1997; 1994; Barkin and DeSombre 2000.

2. Downs et al.1997.

4. Young and Demko 1996, 232.

6. Author interview with Fredrick Bernthal, former Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans, Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES) 1988-90, Chair, IPCC Working Group II, 1988-91.


UNGA 1991b, 89-90.


U.S. Senate 1992, 120.


UNGA 1991c.


See Olsen 1968 for the analysis that initiated this important line of



Oye, 1986; Russet and Sullivan 1971; and Sebenius 1983.


Kahler 1993, 296.


This is not to say that the neoliberals are correct in their analyses.

Kahler 1993 concludes that other obstacles are more important than those presented by large number of parties.

17. Sebenius 1991.

19. Sebenius 1993, 198.

20. This statement ignores the normative aspect of universal participation— the equity issues involved in universal participation. I develop this argument further in later chapters.

22. This is nearly ubiquitously recognized. One prediction is that fossil fuel carbon dioxide emissions from OECD countries will fall to 37 percent of the global total by 2005. See Barrett 1992, 16. Of course, this observation discounts the historical responsibility of Northern states.

23. Rowlands 1995, 188.

25. Litfin 1994.

26. U.S. House of Representatives 1990b, 31.

27. For an argument along these lines specifically regarding climate change see Demeritt 2002.

28. Uncertainty in the science of global change makes the lenses and interpretations even more important in the ozone depletion and climate change cases.

31. Rowlands 1995, 190.

32. Author interviews with Daniel Reifsnyder (Director, Office of Global Change, OES Bureau, U.S. State Department) and William Nitze (Former Deputy

Assistant Secretary of State for Environment, Health and Natural Resources and former Assistant Administrator for International Activities, U.S. EPA).

33. Annex I countries are Northern states

34. Author interview with Nitze.

35. See Gilpin 1981; Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990; Ikenberry 2001.

36. See Brooks and Wohlforth 2002.

37. The EU as a block produced more, but the United States was the largest single-state producer. See Tolba 1998, 63-64.

39. Author interview with Stephen Seidel (Senior Policy Analyst, EPA Air Office).

40. The United States pledged $150 million to aid Southern states with their commitments in the FCCC and funded Southern states in the FCCC at a commensurate level with the requirements.

41. With a few notable divergences discussed in chapter 5.

42. This is not to say that universal participation has not been used strate-gically—it has. Indeed, the U.S. justification for recent (since 2001) activities (or nonactivities) in the climate change negotiations is founded upon the need for universal participation. The idea of universal participation has been used to shape U.S. strategy.

43. An argument could be made that those against significant action were tacticians, and those for significant actions were not, but this assertion about differences in the motivations and reasoning skills/methods of people within the U.S. executive branch does not seem plausible.

44. I return to this argument in chapter 6 and present the empirical evidence in detail.

45. I am not claiming that our understanding of climate change has not improved, rather, the aspect of climate relevant to participation—the scope of the problem—has not changed.

46. Price 1997.

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