Notes

1. For the sake of focus I will not consider more complicated possibilities: for example, the utility of the U.S. refusing to agree, yet complying with the standards in any case.

2. It will not, for example, be able to handle ''utility monster'' cases.

3. This raises the interesting issue of whether or not calculation is necessary to determine when to calculate. But maybe there are virtues of assessment as well.

4. Thus, to respond to Jamieson's query in his paper, my account in Uneasy Virtue is compatible with his, since I am just offering an account of what the virtues are.

5. For more on this criticism of Rule utilitarianism, see Smart's discussion of Utilitarianism in Smart and Williams (1977). Recently, Brad Hooker (2001) has tried to defend Rule consequentialism against this sort of criticism.

7. Of course, this can lead to a separate set of problems. See, for example, Kagan (1998) and also Lenman (2000, Fall).

8. Garret Hardin (1977) explores this issue. I certainly do not mean to endorse Hardin's pessimism. However, the issue of what mechanisms to put in place to deal with persons who would exploit the conscientiousness of others is an important one. It seems to me that government regulation is one way to do this on a large scale and more efficiently than other mechanisms.

10. In this essay I will be leaving aside issues of what emissions standards would be ''fair.'' I think it quite likely that other countries can make a case that the U.S. is already way over the top in terms of polluting the air, and using more than its ''fair share.''

11. Second televised debate, as quoted in Singer (2002, p. 26).

12. Note that in the real world this may not be very demanding - but, of course, it ''could'' be demanding if the level of need were so great that under even full compliance the agent's contribution would have to be quite a bit to bring about the optimal outcome.

13. This will depend on how one interprets Jamieson on non-contingency.

14. I do not mean to suggest that the famine relief cases and the global warming cases are completely analogous. Fairly modest sacrifices of money can have a measurable impact on a starving person's standard of living; modest efforts on emissions reduction will not have much impact on the overall problem. However, many people do see the famine relief problem overall as overwhelming, and not one that the ordinary individual can solve.

16. I discuss this case as an example of a morally charged situation in Driver (1992).

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