The WGIII AR4, in Chapter 3 (Section 3.5.2), looks across findings of the WGI and WGII AR4 to relate the long-term emissions scenarios literature to climate-change impact risks at different levels of global mean temperature change based on key vulnerabilities (as defined in Chapter 19). It builds on the WGI AR4 findings, which outline the probabilities of exceeding various global mean temperatures at different concentration levels (Tables 3.9 and 3.10 in Fisher et al., 2007). The relationships are based on a key finding of the WGI AR4 that there is at least an 83% probability for climate sensitivity to be at or below 4.5°C, while the best estimate is for climate sensitivity to be 3°C. The WGIII AR4 organises the stabilisation scenarios literature by the level of stringency of the scenario, setting out six groups (I-VI) that cover the full range of more to less stringent global warming objectives, in the form of concentrations (ppm) or radiative forcing (W/m2). Table 3.9 uses the WGI AR4 findings to relate increases in global mean temperature to concentration targets, while Table 3.10 relates these outcomes to the emissions pathways associated with alternative stabilisation scenarios. (An important caveat is that these relationships do not consider possible additional CO2 and CH4 releases from Earth-system feedbacks and thus may underestimate required emissions reductions.)
Regarding climate-change impact risks and key vulnerabilities, this literature is organised around increase in global mean temperature. Chapter 19 shows that the following benefits would accrue from constraining temperature rise to 2°C above 1990:
• lowering the risk of widespread deglaciation of the Greenland ice sheet**;
• avoiding large-scale transformation of ecosystems and degradation of coral reefs***;
• preventing terrestrial vegetation becoming a carbon source*/**, constraining species extinction to between 10% and 40%*, and preserving many unique habitats (see Chapter 4, Table 4.1 and Figure 4.5);
• preventing flooding, drought and water-quality declines***, global net declines in food production*/^, and more intense fires**.
Other benefits of this constraint include reducing the risks of extreme weather events**, and of at least partial deglaciation of the West Antarctic ice sheet (WAIS)* (see Chapter 19, Section 19.3.7). By comparison, constraining temperature change to not more than 3°C above 1990 levels will still avoid commitment to widespread deglaciation of the WAIS* and commitment to possible shutdown of the Meridional Overturning Circulation/^ but results in significantly lower avoided risks and impacts in most other areas (Chapter 19, Section 19.3.7).
(Confidence ratings are as provided by WGII Chapter 19 authors: /• = low confidence, * = medium, ** = high, and *** = very high confidence.)
such as small hydropower. In regions where hydropower potentials are still available, and also depending on the current and future water balance, this would increase the competition for water, especially if irrigation might be a feasible strategy to cope with climate-change impacts in agriculture and the demand for cooling water by the power sector is also significant. This reconfirms the importance of integrated land and watermanagement strategies to ensure the optimal allocation of scarce natural resources (land, water) and economic investments in climate-change adaptation and mitigation and in fostering sustainable development.
Hydropower leads to the key area of mitigation: energy sources and supply, and energy use in various economic sectors beyond land use, agriculture and forestry. Direct implications of mitigation efforts on adaptation in the energy, transport, residential/commercial and industrial sectors have been largely ignored so far. Yet, to varying degrees, energy is an important factor in producing goods and providing services in many sectors of the economy, as outlined in the discussion about the importance of energy to achieve the Millennium Development Goals in the WGIII AR4, Chapter 2 (Halsnaes et al., 2007). Reducing the availability or increasing the price of energy therefore has inevitable negative effects on economic development and thus on the economic components of adaptive capacity. The magnitude of this effect is uncertain. Peters et al.
(2001) find that high-level carbon charges (US$200/tC in 2010) affect U.S. agriculture modestly if they are measured in terms of consumer and producer surpluses (reductions by less than half a percent relative to baseline values). However, the decline of net cash returns is more significant (4.1%) and the effects are rather uneven across field crops and regions. Recent studies on the implications for adaptation (capacity and options) indicate that such changes may imply larger policy shifts; for example, towards protection of the most vulnerable (Adger et al., 2006).
The most important indirect link from mitigation to adaptation is through biodiversity, an important factor influencing human well-being in general and the coping options in particular (see MEA, 2005). After assessing a large number of studies, IPCC
(2002) concluded that the implications for biodiversity of mitigation activities depend on their context, design and implementation, especially site selection and management practices. Avoiding forest degradation implies in most cases both biodiversity (preservation) and climate (non-emissions) benefits. However, afforestation and reforestation may have positive, neutral or negative impacts, depending on the level of biodiversity of the ecosystems that will be replaced. By using an optimal-control model, Caparros and Jacquemont (2003) find that putting an economic value on carbon sequestered by forest management does not induce much negative influence on biodiversity, but incentives to sequester carbon by afforestation and reforestation might harm biodiversity due to the overplantation of fast-growing alien species.
These studies demonstrate the intricate inter-relationships between adaptation and mitigation, and also the links with other environmental concerns, such as water resources and biodiversity, with profound policy implications. The land-use and forestry mitigation options in the Marrakesh Accords may provide new markets for countries with abundant land areas but may alter land allocation to the detriment of the landless poor in regions where land is scarce. They present an opportunity for soil and biodiversity protection in regions with ample water resources but may reduce water yields and distort water allocation in water-stressed regions. Accordingly, depending on the regional conditions and the ways of implementation, these implications can increase or reduce the scope for adaptation to climate change by promoting or excluding effective, but more expensive, options due to increased land rents, by supporting or precluding forms and magnitudes of irrigation due to, for example, higher water prices.
Many adaptation options in different impact sectors are known to involve increased energy use and hence interfere with mitigation efforts if the energy is supplied from carbon-emitting sources. Two main types of adaptation-related energy use can be distinguished: one-time energy input for building large infrastructure (materials and construction), and incremental energy input needed continuously to counterbalance climate impacts in providing goods and services. Furthermore, rural renewable electrification can have both huge emissions implications (WEA, 2000) and adaptation implications (Venema and Cisse, 2004).
The largest amount of construction work to counterbalance climate-change impacts will be in water management and in coastal zones. The former involves hard measures in flood protection (dykes, dams, flood control reservoirs) and in coping with seasonal variations (storage reservoirs and inter-basin diversions), while the latter comprises coastal defence systems (embankment, dams, storm surge barriers). Even if these construction projects reach massive scales, the embodied energy, and thus the associated greenhouse-gas emissions, is likely to be merely a small proportion of the total energy use and energy-related emissions in most countries (adaptation-related construction comprises only a small part of total annual construction, and the construction industry itself represents a small part in the annual energy balances of most countries).
The magnitude and relative share of sustained adaptation-related energy input in the total energy balance depends on the impact sector. In agriculture, the input-related (CO2 in manufacturing) and the application-related (N2O from fields) greenhouse-gas emissions might be significant if the increased application of nitrogen fertilisers offers a convenient and profitable solution to avoid yield losses (McCarl and Schneider, 2000). Operating irrigation works and pumping irrigation water could considerably increase the direct energy input, although, where available, the utilisation of renewable energy sources on-site (wind, solar) can help avoid increasing greenhouse-gas emissions.
Adaptation to changing hydrological regimes and water availability will also require continuous additional energy input. In water-scarce regions, the increasing reuse of wastewater and the associated treatment, deep-well pumping, and especially large-scale desalination, would increase energy use in the water sector (Boutkan and Stikker, 2004). Yet again, if provided from carbon-free sources such as nuclear desalination (Misra, 2003;
Ayub and Butt, 2005), even energy-intensive adaptation measures need not run counter to mitigation efforts.
Ever since the early climate impact studies, shifts in space heating and cooling in a warming world have been prominent items on the list of adaptation options (see Smith and Tirpak, 1989). The associated energy requirements could be significant but the actual implications for greenhouse-gas emissions depend on the carbon content of the energy sources used to provide the heating and cooling services. In most cases, it is not straightforward to separate the adaptation effects from those of other drivers in regional or national energy-demand projections. For example, for the U.S. state of Maryland, Ruth and Lin (2006) find that, at least in the medium term up to 2025, climate change contributes relatively little to changes in the energy demand. Nonetheless, the climate share varies with geographical conditions (changes in heating and cooling degree days), economic (income) and resource endowments (relative costs of fossil and other energy sources), technologies, institutions and other factors. Such emissions from adaptation activities are likely to be small relative to baseline emissions in most countries and regions, but more in-depth studies are needed to estimate their magnitude over the long term.
Adaptation affects not only energy use but energy supply as well. Hydropower contributed 16.3% of the global electricity balance in 2003 (IEA, 2005) with virtually zero greenhouse-gas emissions. Climate-change impacts and adaptation efforts in various sectors might reduce the contribution of this carbon-free energy source in many regions as conflicts among different uses of water emerge. Hayhoe et al. (2004) show that emissions even in the lowest SRES (IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios; Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000) scenario (B1) will trigger significant shifts in the hydrological regime in the Sacramento River system (California) by the second half of this century and will create critical choices between flood protection in the high-water period and water storage for the low-flow season. Hydropower is not explicitly addressed but will probably be affected as well. Payne et al. (2004) project conflicts between hydropower and streamflow targets for the Columbia River. Several studies confirm the unavoidable clashes between water supply, flood control, hydropower and minimum streamflow (required for ecological and water quality purposes) under changing climatic and hydrological conditions (Christensen et al., 2004; VanRheenen et al., 2004).
Possibly the largest factor affecting water resources in adaptation is irrigation in agriculture. Yet studies in this domain tend to ignore the repercussions for mitigation as well. For example, Doll (2002) estimates significant increases in irrigation needs in two-thirds of the agricultural land that was equipped for irrigation in 1995, but she does not assess the implications for other water uses such as hydropower and thus for climate-change mitigation.
In general, adaptation implies that people do something in addition to or something different from what they would be doing in the absence of emerging or expected climate-change impacts. In most cases, additional activities involve additional inputs: investments (protective and other infrastructure), material (fertilisers, pesticides) or energy (irrigation pumps, air-conditioning), and thus may run counter to mitigation if the energy originates from greenhouse-gas-emitting sources.
Changing practices in response to climate change offer more opportunities to account for both adaptation and mitigation needs. Besides the opportunities in land-related sectors discussed above, new design principles for commercial and residential buildings could simultaneously reduce vulnerability to extreme weather events and energy needs for heating and/or cooling. Nonetheless, there are path dependencies from past technology choices and infrastructure investments.
In summary, many effects of adaptation on greenhouse-gas emissions and their mitigation (energy use, land conversion, agronomic techniques such as an increased use of fertilisers and pesticides, water storage and diversion, coastal protection) have been known for a long time. The implications of some mitigation strategies for adaptation and other development and environment concerns have been recognised recently. As yet, however, both effects remain largely unexplored. Information on interrelationships between adaptation and mitigation at regional and sectoral levels is rather scarce. Almost all mitigation studies stop at identifying the options and costs of direct emissions reductions. Some of them consider indirect effects of implementation and costs on other sectors or the economy at large but do not deal with the implications for adaptation options of sectors affected by climate change. Similarly, in most cases, climate impact and adaptation assessments do not go beyond taking stock of the adaptation options and estimating their costs, and thus ignore possible repercussions for emissions. One understandable reason is that adaptation and mitigation studies are already complex enough and expanding their scope would increase their complexity even further. Another reason may well be that, as indicated by the few available studies that looked at these inter-relationships, the repercussions from mitigation for adaptation and vice versa are between adaptation and mitigation might be significant but, in most other sectors, the adaptation implications of any mitigation project are small and, conversely, the emissions generated by most adaptation activities are only small fractions of total emissions, even if emissions will decline in the future as a result of climate-protection policies.
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